






December 6, 20041 Introduction
• Design of welfare programs
• Several types of insurance




• Analyze interaction in optimal design in simple
model
• Evaluate consequences of lack of coordination (mul-
tiple agencies)2 The model
• Two periods
• Two types of agents with productivities {xl,x h},
shares (1 − π),π
• Agent’s type private (Mirrlees.)
• No disutility of work ﬁrst period.
• Second period independent shock to disutility of
work e˜F (e).
• Utilitarian Principal.2.1 Design problem and incentives
• Contracts specify {c1h,c 2h,c dh},{c1l,c 2l,c dl}.
• Employment decision in second period:
u(c2h) − eh = u(cdh)
u(c2l) − el = u(cdl)
• Simpliﬁed notation for second period utility:











(u(c) − a)F (da)
• Self selection constraint:
u(c1h)+U2(c2h,c dh) ≥ u(c1l)+U2(c2l,c dl)2.2 The optimal contract
• For convenience take π = 1
2
maxu(c1h)+U2(c2h,c dh)+u(c1l)+U (c2l,c dl)
subject to:
u(c1h)+U2(c2h,c dh) ≥ u(c1l)+U2(c2l,c dl)
0 ≤ xh − c1h +( xh − c2h)F (eh) − (1 − F (eh))cdh
+xl − c1l +( xl − c2l)F (el) − (1 − F (el))cdl2.3 Some results
• First order condition for ﬁrst period consumption:
u0(c1h)=λ − µ
u0(c1l)=λ + µ
• c1l <c 1h if and only if self-selection binds (µ>0).
• eh >e l
• If µ>0, then:
1. c2h >c 2l >c dl >c dh
2. U2h <U 2l
• Remark: with no second period incentive con-
straint → full insurance → all consumptions iden-
tical.
• Incentives for disability limit redistribution.3 Numerical results
• Calibration (π,xl,x h,F,u)
1. π =0 .25
2. xh =3 xl
3. u(c)=l nc
4. F exponential hazard rate λ ∈ {0.5,1,2}
Median Disutility of Effort 
(equivalent % loss in wages) 
    
Hazard    disutility 
    
λ = 0.5    75% 
     
λ = 1    50% 
     
λ = 2    29% 
 Consumption 
(Constrained/Optimal) 
      
  λ = 0.5  λ = 1  λ = 2 
       
C_1l 85  89 96
C_2l 127  118 110
C_dl 70  65 58
    
replacement 55%  55% 53%
    
C_1h 106  123 110
C_2h 169  135 110
C_dh 40  13 0
    
replacement 24%  9% 0%
    
Avg. Replacement  45%  50% 53%
 
• Limited replacement ratios
• Very low for H types.
• Less redistribution ﬁrst period.
• Replacement rates decreasing with λ. 
   Employment and Disability    
           
           
  λ = 0.5    λ = 1     λ = 2   
              
 Optimal  Constrained  Optimal  Constrained Optimal  Constrained
              
F(e_l) 35.1%  25.8% 53.9% 45.1% 75.9% 72.3%
F(e_h) 72.7% 51.2% 90.2% 90.6% 98.6% 100.0%
              
% 
disabled 55.5%  67.8% 37.0% 43.5% 18.4% 20.7%
              
autharky 53% 22% 0%
• Lower employment of low types.
• Increase in % disabled.
• Much more than under autharky. 
 
Welfare 
      
  λ = 0.5  λ = 1  λ = 2 
       
First Best  100.0  100.0 100.0
Constrained 92.7  95.4 98.3
    
Autharky 75.9  77.5 83.6
 
• Big gains relative to autharky.
• Considerable diﬀerence to ﬁr s tb e s tf o rl o wλ.4 Uncoordinated decisions




1. Decides on wage taxes
2. Budget for disability insurance oﬃce.
• Second principal — disability insurance oﬃce:
• Decides cdh and cdl.4.1 Coordination problem
• Free riding on self-selection.
• Does not internalize changes in tax revenue.
• Dynamic game.4.2 Disability insurance oﬃce
• Takes as given c2h,c 2l (follows from taxes)
• Can discriminate between h,l.















































































where λ satisﬁes budget constraint.4.3 First Principal’s problem
• Same as before with the additional constraint:
(1 − F (eh))u0(cdh)
(1 − F (eh)) + f (eh)u0 (cdh)cdh
=
(1 − F (el))u0 (cdl)








• Decreasing in cdj and increasing (decreasing) in
ej if and only if hazard rate is decreasing (increas-
ing).
• If F is exponential, then cdh = cdl is only ad-
ditional constraint. If hazard rate is increasing
cdh <c dl and eh >e l. If hazard rate is decreas-
ing, opposite!4.4 Two principals - numerical results
• Same case as before.
• F is exponential, so only add constraint cdh = cdl.Consumption (two planners/one 
planner) 
      
  λ = 0.5  λ = 1  λ = 2 
       
C_1l 104 104 104
C_2l 93 96 94
C_dl 81 89 70
    
replacement 47.6 51.2 39.5
one planner  55% 55% 53%
    
C_1h 75 83 91
C_2h 117 109 116
C_dh 414 155 -
    
replacement 33% 34% 32%
one planner  24% 9% 0%
    
Avg. Replacement  42% 44% 37%
one planner  45% 50% 53%
 
• More redistribution ﬁrst period (same consump-
tion!)
• Replacement increases for h and decreases for l.   Employment and Disability    
        
        
  λ = 0.5    λ = 1     λ = 2   
              
 Constrained  2  Principals  Constrained  2 Principals  Constrained  2 Principals 
              
F(e_l) 25.8%  28.5% 45.1% 52.4% 72.3% 84.4%
F(e_h) 51.2%  41.8% 90.6% 66.5% 100.0% 89.9%
              
% 
disabled  67.8% 68.2% 43.5% 44.0% 20.7% 14.2%
              
autharky 53% 22% 0%
 
• el goes up and eh goes down. 
Welfare 
      
  λ = 0.5  λ = 1  λ = 2 
       
First Best  100.0  100.0 100.0
Constrained 92.7  95.4 98.3
Two Principals  91.7  93.1 96.5
    
Autharky 75.9  77.5 83.6
 
• Eﬀects not negligible but small.4.5 Redistribution and incentives
 
Redistribution (avg. Taxes on H) 
      
  λ = 0.5  λ = 1  λ = 2 
       
Optimal 55%  55% 53%
       
One planner  46%  44% 48%
       
two planners  45%  45% 46%
 
• Interaction with disability insurance incentives leads
to lower income redistribution.
• Less so in later period.
• Disability much lower for high wage workers.
• Lack of coordination can lead to more equal dis-
ability.